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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
RECOGNITION OF MEXICAN AND

OTHER FOREIGN DIVORCES.-

Observing the increasing number of Mexican divorces, one may
well question the security of the position of those who have relied upon them. The fascination in these divorces lies in the
fact that they are so very simple to obtain and are so very seldom
attacked in collateral proceedings that it is worth while for the
mate-weary spouse to take a chance. All in all the value or effect
of these divorces is dubious, in spite of the assurances of Mexican
divorce lawyers who mail literature to their American colleagues,
assuring them that the Mexican mail-order-power-of-attorney divorce is good and valid in the United States by and because of
the comity existing between the two nations.
The precise question arose in the case of Reik v. Reik. 1 The
defendant had been a resident of Atlantic City, New Jersey, for
a number of years. He had voted there and held a position as
executive secretary of the New Jersey Medical Society. During
his mid-winter vacation, without giving up his position with the
society and without any interruption in his compensation therefrom, he went to Mexico for a rest and incidentally to determine
whether he could comply with the Mexican divorce requirements.
1 109 N. J. Eq. 615, 158 Atl. 519 (1932).
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He was admitted to Mexico on a tourists' passport, remaining
about seven days, during which time he procured his divorce.
Thereafter he returned to Atlantic City, his former place of
residence, remarried and never went back to Mexico. Some
three years prior to his divorce, his first wife had sued for and
obtained an order for separate maintenance. To a petition by
the first wife (filed after the Mexican divorce) to show cause
why the allowance to her should not be increased, the husband
answered setting up the Mexican divorce, the validity of which
became the issue.
It is well settled that as between the states of the Union, there
is a prima facie presumption that any decree rendered by the
courts of any other state is valid in all respects. This presumption is based on the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. As between friendly nations the same presumption is recognized, but here the presumption is sanctioned because of the
comity between the nations. In spite of this presumption, however, the decrees of sister states in the United States are always
open to attack on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the same
is true of foreign judgments.
For a court to render a valid and binding decree it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the persons. Jurisdiction of the person may be obtained by the proper form of service,
or the parties may appear and confer jurisdiction of their persons.
It might be well in passing to note that in cases of Mexican
divorce obtained by a citizen of the United States on constructive
service, the courts of the United States and all the states are
uniform in holding that such decree is entitled to no extraterritorial effect because of lack of jurisdiction of the person by the
court granting the decree. Perhaps it should be said that a
foreign divorce obtained in any state outside of the state of the
matrimonial domicile is subject to the same limitation. To that
effect is the case of Field v. Field,2 an Illinois case which held
that a divorce obtained by the husband in another state upon
constructive service will not be recognized in Illinois, when it
appeared that the husband who procured it practiced fraud upon
the court of the other state in respect- of his residence in that
state, and also in respect of his knowledge of the address of the
defendant. That case involved fraud, but it is not at all necessary that fraud be an element to render a foreign decree obtained
upon constructive service void and of no effect outside the state
where it is rendered. The leading cases in support of this rule
2 215 Ill. 496.
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are Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, and Bell v. Bell.4 To the same
effect are the cases of Snyder v. Buckeye State Building & Loan
Co. et al., 5 and the case of Hood v. State.6 The latter case even
goes to the extent of holding invalid a divorce granted in Utah,
in which state neither of the parties was domiciled or resided,
notwithstanding that the Utah statute undertook to confer jurisdiction to grant divorces at the suit of persons who are not, but
desire to become, residents of the territory. The divorce was
granted upon constructive service upon the wife who did not
appear.
Where the parties have appeared in court or where there has
been personal service, jurisdiction over the person is well established. However, jurisdiction over the person does not give the
court jurisdiction to render a valid decree if it does not have
jurisdiction over the res. "Since the fact that neither party was
domiciled at the divorce forum goes to the jurisdiction of the
subject-matter, and not merely to the jurisdiction of the person
in the particular suit, the jurisdictional defect is not cured by
the appearance of the defendant at the divorce forum, so as to
make the decree effective of its own force in another state, under
the full faith and credit provision." 7 In some states there are
statutes which attempt to control just such a situation by providing that a divorce obtained by a citizen of that state in a foreign
state, for a cause occurring within the state of the domicile, is
void for all purposes and under all circumstances. Such is the
case in Massachusetts as shown in the case of Langewald v.
Langewald.8
The courts of most states are unanimous in holding that an
ex parte hearing on a divorce suit in a state other than that of
the matrimonial domicile is never conclusive on the defendant,
and may or may not be conclusive on the complainant, depending
on whether or not there are circumstances which would create an
estoppel against him. However, there are many states which
hold that where the defendant appears and contests the granting
of the divorce, the final decision is res judicata as to the question
of jurisdiction and cannot subsequently be impeached on collateral attack.9 Some courts base this on the theory that where
3 181 U. S. 179.

181 U. S. 175. See also L. R. A. 1917B 1032.
5160 N. E. 37 (Ohio App. 1928).

4

6 56 Ind. 263.

7 39 A. L. R. 689, note MI, and cases there cited.
8 234 Mass. 269.
9Richards v. Richards, 149 N. Y. S. 1028; Blakeslee v. Blakeslee, 213
Il. App. 168.
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defendant appears, he is precluded from contesting the jurisdiction of that court on the ground of estoppel. 10
It will be found that estoppel is the ground advanced by most
courts in refusing to molest decrees which were rendered by
courts of states which were not the matrimonial domiciles of
either of the parties. It is held almost uniformly that the
spouse who obtained the decree, and those who claim under him
are precluded from attacking it in any collateral proceeding.".
The Mlinnesota Supreme Court in Ellis's Appeal12 asked the question, "When, as between whom, and to what extent is the foreign
divorce decree binding in the state in which the parties are in
fact residents?" It then divided the cases in which the question
might arise into three classes: First, proceedings between the
state of the parties' actual residence and one of the parties;
second, proceedings between the parties in the state of their
residence, where the divorce in the other state was procured on
the application of one of them, the other not appearing in the
action; third, proceedings between the parties when both voluntarily appeared in the action in which the divorce was granted
and consented to the jurisdiction, or that the court might determine the facts on which the jurisdiction depended. It was held
that any party who had conferred jurisdiction upon the foreign
court might be precluded from impeaching its decree in a collateral proceeding. In no case, therefore, could the state of the
actual residence of the parties be precluded; in the second class,
the party who did not submit to the jurisdiction would not be
precluded; but in the second and third classes, the parties who
did submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court would not be
heard to say that the decree was void.
In the case of Langewald v. Langewald,8 the husband was
estopped from attacking the decree which he himself had procured by collusion. In the case of Kaufman v. Kaufman14 a
husband was estopped from questioning the decree divorcing
his wife from her first husband, when he himself had procured
her to go to Nevada and get the divorce so that she might marry
him. In the case of Bruguiere v. Bruguiere,15 the wife was
estopped from attacking the decree obtained by her husband on
the ground that she had remarried since that time, even though
10 Nichols v. Nichols, 25 N. J. Eq. 60; Fairchild v. Fairchild, 53 N. J.
Eq. 678.
11 Bledsoe v. Seaman, 77 Kan. 679. See annotations in 39 A. L. R. 624
and 695.
12 55 Minn. 401.
13 234 Mass. 269.
14 163 N. Y. S. 566.
15 172 Cal. 199.
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she was ignorant that the decree was invalid. In the cases of
Ferry v. Troy Laundry,16 and Elliott v. Wohlfrom, 17 grantees of
a spouse who had procured a foreign divorce through fraud were
held to be precluded from contesting the decree as against the
grantees of the innocent spouse, it being held that the respective
grantees stood in the position of their grantors. Courts are
also loath to disturb decrees after a long space of time has
elapsed since the granting of the decree, and where the rights of
many innocent persons would be prejudiced by declaring the decree invalid.
There are a few cases where courts will give effect to a foreign
decree solely on the grounds of comity, although it is within
their power to refuse effect to such decrees on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction of the court granting the divorce. Such is often
the case where to do so would injure no one and would contradict
no public policy of the state of the forum. Such was the case in
Gould v. Gould,'8 where a New York court gave effect to a
French divorce decree, even though it appeared that the court
which granted it had no jurisdiction.
Where the party is not estopped from contesting the validity
of the decree he may always contest the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter, even where jurisdiction over the person
is established. Domicile, or residence, as it is stated in some
statutes, is the prime factor to be considered in determining
whether or not a foreign decree of divorce will be given any
extraterritorial effect. Bishop 19 says: "The word in most of
our jurisdictional statutes is 'residence,' or 'reside,' or sometimes 'live,' and not the technical 'domicile,' which is the word
commonly used in expositions of the interstate jurisprudence. If,
in interpretation, 'reside' or 'live' is satisfied by something less
than a domicile, our divorces pronounced under command of the
statutes are mere local affairs, or at least not prima facie complying with the interstate law. . . . In Divorce Law, which is a
branch of the private law of nations, and in conformity with
which it should therefore be interpreted, the statutory term
'reside' or 'residence,' including 'inhabitant,' as employed to denote jurisdiction for divorce, should be rendered to mean the
same thing which 'domicile' does in the international law, unless
the contrary is affirmatively manifest from the words of the
statute. And so our courts commonly regard this question."
16 238 P. 867.
17 55 Cal. 384.
18 235 N. Y. 14.
19 New Commentaries on Marriage, Divorce, and Separation (1891),
Vol. II, Ch. 4, sees. 106, 109.
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Although this book was published in the year 1891, its statements
are borne out by many later cases. 20 England and Canada take
the same view of the situation,
as evidenced by
22 the decisions in
21
the cases of Rudd v. Rudd, and Cox v. Cox.
Furthermore, in such cases where the domicile, or residence
animo manendi, as some courts put it, is missing, such decree of
divorce may be attacked in any proceeding, direct or collateral,
in any state of the Union, and may be shown to defeat the jurisdiction of the court granting the divorce. 23 In this regard, the
question of divorce does not differ from any other proceeding.
Where the court rendering the decree had no jurisdiction of the
cause in the first instance, the question of jurisdiction may always be raised on collateral attack, even in spite of a recital of
jurisdiction in the decree.
In the case of State of South Carolina v. William Westmoreland,24 the defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the
crime of adultery. He set up a divorce obtained by him in
Georgia, and contended that he could not, therefore, be guilty
of the crime of adultery. The facts of the case show that the
defendant left his wife, wrongfully, in the state of South Carolina; that he went to Georgia and got a divorce on the ground of
willful and continued desertion for the space of three years.
The state assailed the judgment on the ground that the Georgia
court was without jurisdiction, and introduced evidence to show
that the defendant, at the time he obtained his divorce, was a
resident of South Carolina, not of Georgia. The court charged
the jury that if the defendant went to Georgia for a mere
temporary purpose, with no intent to become a resident, then the
Georgia court was without jurisdiction, and its decree a nullity
having no effect on the status of the defendant as a married man,
and affording him no protection to this charge of adultery. The
defendant excepted to the instruction on the ground that the trial
court should not have allowed the record of the Georgia court,
regular on its face, to be attacked by the introduction of parol
evidence showing want of jurisdiction, and should not have submitted to the jury, under such evidence, the question of domicile,
20 Worthington v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 37 Nev. 212;
Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689; Walker v. Walker, 125 Md.
649; Cherry v. Chicago Life Ins. Co., 190 Ill. App. 70, affirmed in 244
U. S. 25; Anthoney v. Tarpley, 45 Cal. App. 72; Knill v. Knill, 195
N. Y. S. 398; Bonner v. Reandrew, 203 Iowa 1355.
21L. R. [1924] Prob. 72.
22 13 Alberta L. R. 285, 40 D. L. R. 195.
23 Walker v. Walker, 125 Md. 649; Bonner v. Reandrew, 203 Iowa 1355;
Benson v. Benson, 40 F. (2d) 159; State of South Carolina v. Westmoreland, 76 S. C. 145.
24 76 S. C. 145.
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or residence of the defendant necessary to confer jurisdiction on
the Georgia court, but on the contrary should have charged that
the jurisdiction of the Georgia court was not subject to collateral
attack, that the defendant must be considered legally divorced
from his wife, and therefore entitled to an acquittal of the
charge of living in adultery with another woman. The court, in
ruling against him, said that the point had already been conclusively decided by the United States Supreme Court in the case
of Thompson v. Whitman.25 The court there held that neither
the constitutional provision that full faith and credit should be
given in each state, nor the act of Congress passed in pursuance
thereof, prevents an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by
which a judgment offered in evidence was rendered; that the
record of a judgment rendered in another state may be contradicted as to the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction; and
if it be shown that such facts did not exist, the record will be a
nullity, notwithstanding it may recite that they did exist. The
leading cases of Andrews v. Andrews, 20 and Haddock v. Haddock,27 support this statement.
Courts almost uniformly hold that a temporary departure
from the state of the matrimonial domicile into another state does
not constitute a bona fide change of domicile; that the animus
manendi is lacking; and that the decree rendered in such other
state or country is invalid extraterritorially, especially where the
person seeking the divorce goes to the other state for that express
purpose, and in order to evade the laws of his domicile.
The case of Watkinson v. Watkinson 2 holds that the temporary
absence from the state will not be regarded a change of residence,
unless the animus manendi concurs, and that a divorce granted
during such absence in another state will not be recognized by
the state of the domicile. To the same effect were the decisions
in the cases of Friedenwald v. Friendenwald,29 State v. Cooke,80
Fischer v. Fischer,81 and Bruguiere v. Bruguiere,82 where the
evidence bore out the fact that the complainants in the original
divorce proceedings had all gone to another state for the express
purpose of obtaining the divorce, and had then returned to the
states of their domicile. In the case of Knill v. Knill,3 3 the facts
25 18 Wall. 457.
26 188 U. S. 14.

201 U. S. 562.
68 N. J. Eq. 632.
29 16 F. (2d) 509.
80 110 Conn. 348.
81 254 N. Y. 463.
82 172 Cal. 199.
88 195 N. Y. S. 398.
27

28
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show that the wife wilfully left the husband in New York and
went to Connecticut; that he went to Nevada to obtain a divorce
which he could not get in New York; that he started an action
there for divorce; that the wife in a separate action in Connecticut admitted his residence in Nevada. Nevertheless the
court in this case, which is a suit for annulment by a woman
whom defendant subsequently married, held the divorce invalid
and granted the annulment.
There are but few cases in the books concerning the validity
of Mexican divorces, as distinguished from other foreign divorce,
which have reached the highest courts of the states or of the
United States. Among these are Bonner v. Reandrew et al."
and Galloway v. Galloway.85 The case of Bonner v. Reandrew
et al. was an Iowa suit for alienation of the affections of the
plaintiff's husband. The gist of the defense was that there were
no affections to alienate. The defendants set up in support
thereof a Mexican divorce procured by. the husband in Merida,
Mexico. In this case, as in many others, there was nothing in
the record to show domicile except the jurisdictional finding in
the decree that "he is a resident of this place." The court in
the Iowa case held that the Mexican decree was invalid for lack
of jurisdiction, and that it was no defense to the present action.
Galloway v. Galloway et al. was a California suit wherein the
wife was seeking separate maintenance. The husband set up a
Mexican divorce, which was held a good defense only because
there was no evidence of bad faith or lack of integrity. The
court said that good faith of the husband in obtaining the decree
in Mexico, and the integrity of the judgment of the foreign court
is presumed in an attack on a foreign divorce. The court of the
forum is not bound to suspect that a decree of a foreign court
was rendered in bad faith. However, the court also said that a
divorce obtained in another state through fraudulent residence
simulated for that purpose and not in good faith is open to attack
in the state of the true matrimonial domicile, intimating that
had there been any evidence of bad faith in the establishment of
a domicile in Mexico, or any fraud on the part of the husband,
it would have held otherwise than it did.
In the case under discussion the court held the Mexican divorce
invalid for want of jurisdiction over the res, because the complainant in the divorce proceeding had not established a bona
fide residence in Mexico. In view of the fact that the first wife
had not conferred jurisdiction of her person on the Mexican
court, and was therefore not estopped to attack the decree, no
other result could have been reached by the court.
34 203 Iowa 1355.
85 2 P. (2d) 842.
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TORT-LIABILITY

OF

MANUFACTURER

TO

THIRD

PARTIES

FOR

NELImECE.-Appellees, husband and wife, recovered a verdict

against the appellant in the lower court for damages sustained
through the alleged negligence of the appellant, caused by the
explosion of a chemical disinfectant manufactured and alleged
to have been sold to them by defendant. The proofs showed that
when the wife picked up from a shelf the purchased bottle of
defendant's disinfectant, it exploded and destroyed the sight of
one of her eyes. After verdict the court refused a new trial.
This appeal was taken on the ground that the court should have
given binding instructions for the defendant to the effect that as
a matter of law the appellant was free from liability to the appellees because the disinfectant was not sold direct by the defendant; also that it was error to allow proofs by persons in the
neighborhood that this same disinfectant, bought by them about
the same time and from the same vendor from whom the appellee's had purchased theirs, had exploded. The lower court's
judgment was affirmed.1
As to the liability of manufacturers, contractors, or vendors
to third persons who are not in privity of contract with them,
the general rule is that there is no liability for negligence in
the process of manufacturing. 2 Wharton 8 grounds the doctrine on
the break in "the causal connection ...

by the sale or transfer

from the maker or builder to the buyer or employer." The reasoning is sound if the sale actually breaks the causal connections
of the injury.
However, where the article manufactured is one which is in
its nature imminently dangerous, such as gunpowder or poison,
the law imposes a duty on the manufacturer to exercise care in
the process of manufacture-this despite the break in the causal
relation.
A careful perusal of the cases indicate that almost all courts
would hold one liable for injuries caused by dangerous instrumentalities. The confusion found is one of definition. What is
a dangerous instrumentality? When is a thing imminently dangerous? What is the standard of diligence required? Let us
look to the cases.
1 W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Shoultz et ux., 56 F. (2d) 148 (1932).
2 Cooley on Torts (1907), p. 773; Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine
Co., 120 F. 865; Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419;
Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79; Winterbottom v. Wright,
10 M. & W. 109; Marquardt v. Ball Engine Co., 122 P. 374; MeCaffrey v.
Mossberg & Granville Mfg. Co., 23 R. I. 381.
8 Negligence, (2d ed.) sec. 438.
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Justice Cardozo puts the answers clearly. 4 "If the nature of
a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its
nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to
the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing
will be used by persons other than the purchaser, . . . then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is
under a duty to make it carefully.... There must be knowledge
of a danger, not merely possible, but probable. It is possible to
use almost anything in a way that will make it dangerous if
defective. That is not enough to charge the manufacturer with
a duty independent of his contract. Whether a given thing is
dangerous may be sometimes a question for the court and sometimes a question for the jury. There must also be knowledge
that in the usual course of events the danger will be shared by
others than the buyer. Such knowledge may often be inferred
from the nature of the transaction."
The producer ought, then, to be held liable for the results of
negligent acts which he can readily foresee, but not where defective material, after passing through many hands, produces unlooked for ill effects. The iron manufacturer who fails to inspect
a piece of iron cannot foresee that it will be used in a boiler and
cause a ship to sink. But the meat packer who fails to inspect
his products for poisonous parasites or ingredients knows that
if anyone is to be poisoned through his neglect it will be the
ultimate consumer and not the marketman with whom he con5
tracts.
Things imminently dangerous to life are not restricted to poisons, explosives, deadly weapons-things whose normal function
it is to injure or destroy. As Justice Cardozo remarked," "A
scaffold 7 is not inherently a destructive instrument. It becomes
destructive only if imperfectly constructed. A large coffee urns
may have within itself, if negligently made, the potency of danger, yet no one thinks of it as an implement whose normal function is destructive."
A bottle of aerated water or carbonated
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382.
5 Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322; Tomlinson v. Armour & Co.,
75 N. J. L. 748.
6 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382.
4

7 Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470.
FStatler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N. Y. 478.
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beverage, 9 a building, 10 an elevator,1 ' a defective rope,U or
chain, 13 have been held to be imminently dangerous when negligently made.
The earlier cases involving automobiles, tractors, etc., limited
the manufacturer's liability to his immediate transferees. 14 They
were held to be not imminently dangerous and therefore the manufacturer was not held liable for negligence in the absence of
contractural relations. The MacPherson case 15 is the landmark
of the newer doctrine as to automobiles. It led the Federal
court to overrule its earlier decision in Johnson v. CadillacMotor
Car Company,'8 and its reasoning is followed in the more recent
rulings. 17 The New Jersey court in Heckel v. Ford Motor Corn9 Torgeson v. Schultz, 192 N. Y. 156; Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
307 Mo. 520; Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118 (282
S. W. 778); Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 176 N. C. 256. In
Bates v. Baley & Co., Ltd., L. R. [1913] 3 K. B. 351, it was found that
a bottle of ginger beer was dangerous, because the bottle was defectively
made, and that the bottler was negligent, because the defect could have
been discovered, but judgment was given for the defendant, since he did
not in fact know of the defect. This view, followed by some courts, bases
the liability on deceit. See Heizer v. Kingsland & Douglass Mfg. Co., 110
Mo. 605 and Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341.
10 Burke v. Ireland, 50 N. Y. S. 369.

11 Kahner v. Otis Elevator Co., 89 N. Y. S. 105.
12 Davies v. Pelham Hod Elevating Co., 20 N. Y. S. 523, affirmed in
146 N. Y. 363.
Is Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Columbus McKinnon Chain
Co., 13 F. (2d) 128.
14Automobiles: Burkett v. Studebaker, 126 Tenn. 467, (1912); Olds
Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616 (1911); Ford Motor Co. v. Iaversay,
61 Okla. 231 (1916); Ford Motor Co. v. Meyers, 151 Miss. 73 (1928).
Threshing Machine: Heizer v. Kingland & Co., 110 Mo. 105 (1892).
Defective locomotive: Smith v. Onderdonk, 25 Ont. App. 271 (1898).
Goods elevator: Zieman v. Kieckhofer, 90 Wis. 497 (1895).
15 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382.
16 The District Court for the Northern District of New York in Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 194 F. 497, upheld liability. On appeal to
the Circuit Court the case was reversed, because the court held that
privity of contract was required to hold the manufacturer liable. Cadillac
Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801. The MacPherson Case was decided
in 1916. In 1919, on a second appeal, the reasoning of the since decided
MacPherson case so impressed the court that it adopted its doctrine.
Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 F. 878.
17Lajorie v. Roberts, 50 Que. Super. 395, 33 D. L. R. 577 (1917);
Collette v. Page, 44 R. I. 26 (1921); Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 267 Ill.
App. 68 (1932); Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F. (2d) 310 (1930); Flies
v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. (1928); Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F. (2) 253
(1926).
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pany,18 indicate that "reasonable care in manufacture and reasonable care in applying reasonable tests" are required of an
automobile manufacturer, but that "an automobile manufacturer
is not an insurer that wheels purchased from reputable manufacturer are free from defects." The manufacturer has the duty
of using reasonable care. 19
In a recent Illinois appellate case, 20 although a dealer sold a
new Ford truck with a defect which could have been discovered
by a proper inspection, the dealer was held not liable for injuries
to a bystander who was struck by a wheel when it became detached from the truck, because privity of contract between the
plaintiff and dealer was lacking, and because such an injury was
not thought to be foreseeable.
While the disinfectant in the principal case was not an article
whose normal function it was to destroy (except germs), it was
known to the manufacturer that unless care was exercised in
the preparation of the ingredients to exclude pent-up gas, the gas
was likely to accumulate and cause explosions. The liability of
the manufacturer should not rest, as some courts seem to have
indicated that it should, upon any misconduct of the manufacturer as a vendor, but rather it should rest, as the principal case
suggests, upon the failure to exercise ordinary care in the process of manufacturing a product which might become dangerous
if negligently made. Knowledge of the defect in any particular
article, then, is immaterial if the defect might be discovered by
the exercise of ordinary care in inspecting or testing.
18 101 N. J. L. 385.

19 Martin v. Studebaker Corporation, 102 N. J. L. 612.
20Shepard v. Kensington Steel Co., 262 fll. App. 117, petition for
certiorari dismissed, 266 Ill. App. xxxvi.

